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Abstract
In many large scale distributed systems and on the web, agents need
to interact with other unknown agents to carry out some tasks or trans-
actions. The ability to reason about and assess the potential risks in
carrying out such transactions is essential for providing a safe and reliable
environment. A traditional approach to reason about the trustworthi-
ness of a transaction is to determine the trustworthiness of the specific
agent involved, derived from the history of its behavior. As a departure
from such traditional trust models, we propose a generic, machine learn-
ing approach based trust framework where an agent uses its own previous
transactions (with other agents) to build a knowledge base, and utilize
this to assess the trustworthiness of a transaction based on associated
features, which are capable of distinguishing successful transactions from
unsuccessful ones. These features are harnessed using appropriate ma-
chine learning algorithms to extract relationships between the potential
transaction and previous transactions. The trace driven experiments us-
ing real auction dataset show that this approach provides good accuracy
and is highly efficient compared to other trust mechanisms, especially
when historical information of the specific agent is rare, incomplete or
inaccurate.
Keywords: trust management, machine learning, features, large-scale
systems
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1 Introduction
Trust is an important ingredient facilitating reliable interactions1 among au-
tonomous participants without global coordination in diverse large-scale sys-
tems including e-commence, distributed and peer-to-peer systems, multi-agent
systems and dynamic collaborative systems. Due to the large scale and open-
ness of these systems, an agent is often required to interact with other agents
with which it has few or no shared past interactions. To assess the risk of such
interactions and to determine whether an unknown agent is trustworthy, an
efficient trust mechanism is necessary [15, 10].
Traditional approaches, while effective when the necessary information is
available, often rely upon knowledge that may not actually be available locally
to the assessor. For instance, the interaction partner recently joins the system
so its past behavior is quite limited; or it is difficult to form the trust path to
derive trustworthiness of the target agent (i.e., opinions from other agents who
have interacted with the target agent are insufficient or ingenuine). Hence, we
want to develop a new trust mechanism to compute trust even in absence of his-
torical information of the specific agent in question. In this paper, we propose
a generic trust framework, which investigates trustor’s local knowledge using
machine learning algorithms. Machine learning aims to automatically learn to
recognize complex patterns and make intelligent decisions based on existing
datasets. Since each agent may have past transactions with other agents2, we
argue that by investigating useful features that are capable of distinguishing
successful transactions from unsuccessful ones, we can apply sophisticated ma-
chine learning algorithms to analyze past transactions to learn what a successful
transaction is and then apply the result of learning to predict trustworthiness of
a potential transaction. This new mechanism, given its use of different kind of
information, is meant to complement traditional models, and given its reliance
of different set of information, should and can not be compared beyond the
purpose of validation.
To explain how our approach works and differs from traditional trust mech-
anisms, let us use an analogy with our behavior in the real world. When a
customer, say Bob, wants to evaluate the trustworthiness of a provider, say
Sally’s restaurant (i.e., to guess how he will be satisfied by Sally’s food), it is
possible to consider two different cases:
• Bob has access to some feedbacks specifically about Sally’s restaurant.
For instance, Bob has already eaten there in the past, or maybe one of
Bob’s friends did, and gave Bob some feedbacks about it. Then Bob uses
these feedbacks to decide whether he will eat at Sally’s restaurant or not.
This is the case that traditional recommendation systems rely upon. More
generally these recommendation systems will try to find feedbacks about
1Throughout this paper, we use the terms interaction and transaction interchangeably.
2One weak assumption of this work is that trustor has sufficient past transactions such
that machine learning algorithms can be performed. In case trustor is new or inactive in the
system, i.e., no or few past transactions are available, we use a overlay network where peers
share their local knowledge to augment the trustor’s sparse knowledge.
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Sally’s restaurant among Bob’s friends, or among the friends of Bob’s
friends (FoF), or from online restaurant review sites and so on. As we
will see in the related works section, this method performs well, but has
several drawbacks: (i) Bob has to find somehow a chain of friends that
will provide him feedback, (ii) Bob needs to trust, and to have the same
food taste as his feedback providers.
• In all other cases, for example when Bob is abroad or when Sally’s restau-
rant just opened, Bob uses a different mechanism. Indeed, Bob will rely
on his own experience about restaurants to make a first estimate on Sally’s
offer: he will look at the global presentation of Sally and her restaurant,
the amount of other clients, the menu, the prices and the location. Then
he will compare this with what he knows about the other restaurants
in the same city/country, of the same type, or where he previously had
good/bad experience with the food he wants to order. This is essentially
how our proposal works. Instead of relying on a chain of recommendation
to assess trustworthiness, it relies on the user’s (Bob) personal experience.
Of course, the success of this assessment relies on two hypotheses: (i) the
user has enough experience, and (ii) it is possible to learn and predict,
from these experiences, the outcome of a new transaction. Our experi-
mental results, conducted using data from an auction site show that these
assumptions do hold in (some) real scenarios, where our proposal manages
to predict efficiently auction frauds.
Note that our proposal is a generic trust framework, so various machine
learning algorithms can be integrated, demonstrating that trustworthiness can
be efficiently learned. In this work, we use two common but effective machine
learning algorithms: linear discriminant analysis (LDA) [19, 9] and decision tree
(DT) [22, 20] as the case studies for presentation, experiments and validation
of our proposal. LDA is a well known method for dimensionality reduction and
classification. It takes as input a set of events belonging to k (≥ 2) different
classes and characterized by various features, and finds a combination of the
features (a classifier) that separates these k classes of events. As an example,
linear discriminant analysis was used to differentiate subspecies of beetles based
on measurements of their physical characteristics. DT is a widely used and
practical method for classification and prediction by providing a classifier in the
form of a tree structure. Its popularity is due to the ability of generating rules
which can be easily expressed visually and in human language.
Although LDA and DT are simple, as seen in our real auction data driven
experiments, they are both effective and efficient. Given proposed generic and
extendable framework, more sophisticated methods (e.g., multiple discriminant
analysis) may be applied. The associated trade-offs are not explored in this
paper.
In our proposal, the agent’s local knowledge (i.e., the past interactions) are
described by a set of features. Without loss of generality, we assume two classes:
successful and unsuccessful interactions. Note that all the interactions have the
same feature set. For LDA, features must be quantitative, but can take values on
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an unbound domain. The agent who needs to evaluate the potential interaction
divides its historical interactions into two groups: successful and unsuccessful.
He then performs a LDA on this two groups to obtain a linear classifier that
allows him to estimate whether the potential interaction is likely to get classified
in the successful group or not. For DT, the features can be quantitative or
qualitative. A decision tree is firstly constructed from the training data. Then
the algorithm classifies an example data by starting from the root of the tree
and moving (down) until a leaf node, which is actually the classification of
the example data. Since different machine learning algorithms may produce
different results in the same scenario (due to their suitability), we also investigate
confidence of each algorithm recommendation to help trustor make the wiser
decision. Please note that our proposal is designed for decentralized systems,
since each agent uses its own local knowledge to evaluate trustworthiness of
a transaction he might get involved in. However, this framework can be also
applied in a centralized context, where all agents’ local knowledge is gathered in
a system-wide knowledge repository. In this context, multiple local knowledge
can be aggregated to issue a better trust assessment.
In case trustor does not have sufficient local knowledge, we propose to con-
struct a local knowledge sharing overlay network (LKSON), which allows local
information (i.e., intermediate results of machine learning algorithms) to be
exchanged between trustworthy agents. Such mechanism helps inexperienced
agents to bootstrap in the system.
The contribution of this paper is to define a generic trust framework based
on machine learning that is designed/suited for large-scale open systems. Since
our proposal generally relies on machine learning algorithms (e.g., LDA and
DT in this paper), we argue that trustworthiness of a potential transaction can
be efficiently learned using trustor’s local knowledge and the result of learn-
ing provides a good guidance on decision making. Moreover, confidence of the
algorithm recommendations is studied to make decision wisely. Our proposal
can be treated as a complimentary and alternative mechanism to provide pre-
diction for a potential interaction, especially when there is no or few (reliable)
global information available. Moreover, compared to existing reputation based
trust models, our proposal is more robust: (1) it mainly relies on trustor’s local
knowledge thus lowering the risk of suffering inaccurate third party informa-
tion; (2) features are difficult to fake since malicious agent is unaware of (or
much efforts are needed to investigate) trustor’s local knowledge thus may find
it difficult to suitably modify features to mislead trustor. Our proposal also
allows efficient information sharing to bootstrap inexperienced agents. Simula-
tion based evaluation shows that compared to other trust models, our proposal
is efficient, especially when third party information is not reliable. Moreover,
performance of our proposal is quite stable because it only relies on trustor’s
local knowledge. Real auction dataset based evaluation also demonstrates the
efficacy of our proposal in a realistic setting, e.g., for detecting auction frauds.
Note that since our proposal is particularly developed for evaluating trust-
worthiness of the transactions which are conducted by unknown service providers,
we do not discuss how to maintain trust ratings of known agents, which can be
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easily handled by any traditional trust management mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Generic trust framework
is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we demonstrate how our proposal
works using machine learning algorithms LDA and DT as the case studies in
subsections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. Confidence of algorithm recommendation is
studied in Section 4. We then discuss the issue of sharing local knowledge among
the agents in Section 5. Evaluation is performed on our proposal in Section 6
using both real online auction dataset and synthetic dataset. In Section 7 we
present related works regarding trust management. Finally we conclude our
work and suggest some future research directions in Section 8.
2 A generic trust framework
Unlike existing trust mechanisms, our proposal does not capture the behavior
of individual agent to decide whether or not to interact with it but focuses on
a potential interaction itself by estimating its reliability based on features of
this interaction and trustor’s local knowledge. This avoids the risk of suffering
inaccurate third party information.
2.1 Notation
We refer to a participant in the system as an agent. We denote by A the set
of all agents in the system. There are two types of agents, customers, which
request service from other agents and providers, which provide service. An agent
can be both customer and service provider but in a specific transaction, it plays
only one role. A transaction in the system happens when an agent accepts
another agent’s service. To indicate the quality of a service, an agent can rate
the transaction. In our model, the rating of a transaction is binary: successful
or unsuccessful. Θax,ay denotes the transaction between provider agent ay and
customer agent ax. Note that without loss of generality, each Θ represents a
unique transaction. If multiple transactions happen between the same pair of
agents, we simply create a new virtual agent with the same characteristics. Each
transaction Θ is described by a set of features, denoted by FΘ = {f1Θ, f
2
Θ, ..., f
d
Θ}.
Each agent ax in the system maintains a transaction database Trax =
{Θax,a1 ,Θax,a2 , ...}, which records historical transactions of this agent with
other agents. Such local knowledge is used by our trust framework to perform
machine learning algorithm to predict trustworthiness of a potential transaction.
2.2 Feature collection
Features can be collected from profile of the transaction partner, or the context
of the transaction depending on specific applications. Let us take online auction
as an example to demonstrate how features are collected. Buyer Bob is evalu-
ating a potential transaction of purchasing a camera from the seller Sally. The
features associated with this transaction can be collected from three aspects:
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(1) about Sally herself, e.g., age, gender, is she from the same country as bob?
physical distance to bob, etc.
(2) about Sally as a user in the system, e.g., age in the system, numbers of
successful and unsuccessful transactions, does Sally has provided a phone
number? how complete is her profile? number of items Sally already sold,
average delivering time, average time between end of auction and user
comment, number of friends Sally has, etc.
(3) the cameras Sally sells, e.g., average item price (items in the same cate-
gory), number of the same items in stock, number of comments on these
cameras, number of different buyers that already placed bid on it, average
age in the system of buyers that already placed bid, etc.
Two points regarding feature collection need to be noted: (i) Sally can cheat
and set fake information about herself, but faking information from the 2nd and
3rd aforementioned categories is harder since this information is maintained by
the service exchange platform. (ii) Although, if available and appropriate, our
proposal also uses historical information (e.g., numbers of successful and unsuc-
cessful transactions, etc.) like traditional trust mechanisms, the information is
used in a quite different way, i.e., it is not directly used to derive trust but is
used as a feature to help extract relationship between the potential transaction
and past successful/unsuccessful transactions. We will show in evaluation that
by suitably using historical information as the features, our proposal outper-
forms traditional trust mechanisms that directly use historical information to
derive trust.
We argue that compared to existing reputation based trust models, the fea-
ture collection process of our proposal is more robust against malicious agents:
for a traditional reputation based trust model, when trustor requests opinions
about the target agent, malicious entities can easily counterfeit the feedbacks to
promote or bad-mouth the target agent and trustor needs much efforts to filter
out these false feedbacks, but for our proposal, since attackers are unaware of
trustor’s local knowledge, it is difficult to fake features associated with the po-
tential transaction to mislead the trustor. Our proposal is thus more resilient
to the attacks that are common to current reputation based trust systems.
2.3 Architecture
Fig. 1 depicts the architecture of our proposal. The framework consists of
three components: storage component (SC), trust calculation engine (TCE)
and knowledge collector (KC).
Storage component is responsible for managing local knowledge, including
agent’s past transactions as well as third party knowledge collected from other
agents. After each transaction, agent records associated information such as
characteristics of the transaction partner, outcome of the transaction and other
related features (done by feature extraction engine), depending on the types of
applications. For instance, in online auction site, such features may be price or
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Figure 1: The architecture.
Table 1: Structure of local knowledge repository
Tran. ID Tran. partner outcome Price of
the item
♯ of items al-
ready sold
...
Θ1 a1 1 6.99 891 ...
Θ2 a2 0 9.99 337 ...
Θ3 a3 0 12.99 120 ...
......
category of the item, or number of items already sold by the seller, etc. (see
Table 1 as an example using Allegro [3] dataset). These past transactions are
used as the knowledge base to perform machine learning algorithms.
Our trust framework is generic in two senses, the approach can be applied
for different applications and correspondingly diverse features; and diverse ma-
chine learning approaches may be plugged in in the framework. Trust calcula-
tion engine is responsible for applying machine learning algorithms to predict
trustworthiness of the potential transaction using local knowledge or collected
knowledge as the training set. Depending on application scenario, TCE is able
to choose the appropriate machine learning algorithm to conduct trust calcu-
lation. For instance, if features are quantitative, discriminant analysis will be
used, otherwise, if several features are qualitative, DT is more suitable. Actu-
ally, subject to time/computation restriction, TCE will apply as many suitable
algorithms as possible. In case the result is not consistent across all algorithms,
TCE returns the result that is calculated by the algorithm which has the highest
confidence. Measurement of such confidence is algorithm dependent and we will
discuss this issue in Section 4.
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With sufficient local knowledge and suitable machine learning algorithms,
trustor is able reliably predict trustworthiness of a potential transaction. How-
ever, when local knowledge is insufficient, machine learning algorithms will per-
form poorly. To address this issue we propose to construct a local knowledge
sharing overlay network (LKSON) where agents are able to share their local in-
formation (done by knowledge collector (KC)). Different from traditional trust
mechanisms where feedbacks of the specific agent are shared, in our approach,
agents only exchange intermediate machine learning algorithm result (see Sec.
5). Such a strategy has several advantages: (1) the shared information is just in-
termediate result of an algorithm so it is not easy to dig out agent’s privacy, i.e.,
identification; (2) since information provider does not know whom the trustor is
evaluating as well as trustor’s local knowledge, it is difficult to send fake infor-
mation to promote or bad-mouth some specific agent; (3) a lot of computation
duplication is avoided. We will present the local knowledge sharing overlay net-
work in detail in Section 5. We next present details of our machine learning
based trust assessment algorithms.
3 Machine learning algorithms for trust assess-
ment
A machine learning algorithm for trust assessment takes as input a set of
trustor’s past transactions with other agents and the feature vector associated
with each transaction. The output of the algorithm is a prediction indicating
the potential transaction is reliable or risky, with a recommendation confidence
(see local knowledge repository (with feature extraction engine) and trust cal-
culation engine in Fig. 1).
We next use two common but effective machine learning algorithms, i.e.,
linear discriminant analysis and decision tree as the case studies to demonstrate
how our proposal works. Algorithm recommendation confidence is discussed in
Section 4.
3.1 Case study: Using linear discriminant analysis
Consider a scenario where a customer ax encounters a potential service provider
ay and ax has no prior experience with ay. We assume that ax can obtain fea-
tures of this potential transaction Θax,ay (e.g., from ay’s personal profiles and
from the transaction offer it received). The set of such features of Θax,ay is de-
noted by FΘax,ay = {f
1
Θax,ay
, f2Θax,ay
, ..., fdΘax,ay
}. (to simplify the notation, we
use f i instead of f iΘax,ay when the context is clear). So the potential transaction
is represented by vector p = (f1 f2 f3 . . . fd).
We assume that ax has recorded n historical transactions. To estimate reli-
ability of the potential transaction, ax classifies its historical transactions into
two disjoint groups, the successful transaction group Gs and the unsuccessful
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transaction group Gu according to the outcomes of these transactions. The two
transaction groups are represented as3:
Gs =


f1Θax,a1
(s) f2Θax,a1
(s) ... fdΘax,a1
(s)
...
...
...
...
f1Θax,ans
(s) f2Θax,ans
(s) ... fdΘax,ans
(s)

 (1)
Gu =


f1Θax,a1
(u) f2Θax,a1
(u) ... fdΘax,a1
(u)
...
...
...
...
f1Θax,anu
(u) f2Θax,anu
(u) ... fdΘax,anu
(u)

 (2)
ns and nu are the sizes of successful transaction group and unsuccessful
transaction group respectively. Please note that n = ns + nu.
ax performs linear discriminant analysis to classify the potential transaction
as belonging to successful or unsuccessful transaction group to decide whether
or not to transact with the corresponding service provider for the specific trans-
action. The mathematical operations are the following. Let hx be a x × 1
(column) vector of ones.
ax first calculates centroid of each group. That is, for each feature, we
calculate average value of this feature across all transactions in the group.
cs =
1
ns
· hTnsGs and cu =
1
nu
· hTnuGu, (3)
Similarly, the global centroid is calculated by averaging each feature across
all past transactions:
c =
1
n
· hTn
[
Gs
Gu
]
(4)
In LDA, the internal variance (within-class scatter matrix) and external
variance (between-class scatter matrix) are used to indicate the degree of class
separability, i.e., to what extent are the successful transactions distinguished
from the unsuccessful transactions. The internal variance, which is the expected
covariance of each group is given by Eq. 5 and 6:
Ssw =
1
ns
(Gs − hnscs)
T (Gs − hnscs), (5)
Suw =
1
nu
(Gu − hnucu)
T (Gu − hnucu). (6)
hns and hnu are used to center the values around the centroids cs and cu. So
the overall within-class scatter matrix is calculated as the weighted sum of each
3We assume an agent is aware of context of the transaction. For instance, when evaluating
an unknown book seller, the buyer only considers past transactions regarding purchasing
books, not that regarding purchasing other irrelevant items like digital cameras.
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group’s internal variance, where the weight is fraction of transactions regarding
the corresponding group:
Sw =
1
n
(nsS
s
w + nuS
u
w). (7)
Then ax calculates external variance, which is actually the covariance of the
two groups, each of which is represented by its mean vector (Eq. 8).
Sb =
1
n
(ns(cs − c)
T (cs − c) + nu(cu − c)
T (cu − c)), (8)
The mixture scatter matrix, i.e., the total variance of the system is obtained
by summing up internal variance Sw and external variance Sb (Eq. 9).
Sm = Sw + Sb. (9)
LDA aims to find a projection direction (a transformation) v that maximizes
the inter class variance and minimizes the intra class variance. Formally, the
criterion function (see Eq. 10) is to be maximized.
J(v) =
vTSbv
vTSwv
(10)
The projection direction v is found as the eigenvector associated with the
largest eigenvalue of S−1w Sb. We then transform the two groups of transactions
using v. Similarly, the potential transaction p = (f1 f2 f3 . . . fd) is also trans-
formed and classified by measuring the distances between transformed potential
transaction and the two groups (i.e., centroid). Eq. 11, 12 show how to calculate
such distances:
Ds = v
T p− vT cs (11)
Du = v
T p− vT cu (12)
If Du > Ds, then transaction p is predicted as successful, otherwise it is
predicted as unsuccessful.
Note that we try to collect as many features of a transaction as possible,
and the algorithm filters out the not-so-relevant variables for us. That is to say,
the feature which is more capable of distinguishing successful transactions from
unsuccessful ones will have more impact on the final classification result.
3.2 Case study: Using decision tree
The basic idea of decision tree is to classify objects by sorting them from root
of the tree to some leaf node, which provides classifications of the objects. Each
node (except the leaf nodes) in the tree represents some feature of the object,
and the value of such feature is the criteria by which the current set of objects
are put in the final classifications or further split into smaller classes that will be
classified according to other selected features (i.e., child nodes of current node).
This process continues until all objects are classified.
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When encountering a potential transaction from an unknown agent, trustor
ax has n past transactions with other agents, denoted by Trax = {Θ1,Θ2, ...,Θn}.
Each past transaction Θ is described by the same set of features FΘ = {f1Θ, f
2
Θ, ..., f
d
Θ}.
Such knowledge is used to construct the decision tree to generate a classifier
(rule) to predict whether a potential transaction is risky or not4.
From a given past transaction set, it is possible to construct several different
decision trees, depending on the order in which transaction features are tested.
Since building an optimal decision tree (e.g., optimal with respect to its size)
is NP hard [11] and therefore, several heuristics have been proposed to build
efficient learning trees (e.g., ID3 [22], C4.5 [24], etc.). Without loss of generality,
we hereafter present one of these heuristics, namely ID3 [22]. ID3 is a well known
algorithm that relies on information gain [18] to select the classifying features
at each node of the tree. Information gain is measured by entropy.
Given the binary categorization (i.e., successful and unsuccessful) and past
transactions, we denote the proportion of successful and unsuccessful transac-
tions by ps and pu respectively. Then the entropy of all past transactions is:
Entropy(Trax) = −pslog2(ps)− pulog2(pu) (13)
Entropy is used to characterize (im)purity of a collection of examples. From
Eq. 13 we can see entropy will have the minimum value of 0 when all past trans-
actions belong to one class (i.e., successful or unsuccessful) and the maximum
value of log22 = 1 when past transactions are evenly distributed across the two
classes. Using entropy, we now calculate information gain of every feature (with
respect to a set of past transactions Tr) to determine the best feature to choose
for a node in the decision tree. For each feature fi, we assume it has a set of
values (e.g., discrete variable) or intervals (e.g., continuous variable), which is
denoted by V (fi). For each v ∈ V (fi), we denote the set of past transactions
that are associated with v for feature fi by Trv. The information gain of feature
fi is thus calculated by:
IGain(Tr, fi) = Entropy(Tr) −
∑
v∈V (fi)
|Trv|
|Tr|
Entropy(Trv) (14)
The information gain of a feature measures expected reduction in entropy
by considering this feature. Clearly, the higher the information gain, the lower
the corresponding entropy becomes and thus the better the classification of past
transactions is achieved (by considering the corresponding feature).
Using information gain, a decision tree is iteratively constructed by maxi-
mizing information gain at each step. We next describe how decision tree is
constructed (Algo. 1) by ID3 algorithm.
The ID3 algorithm input is trustor ax’s past transactions Trax and the fea-
ture vector F that describe each transaction. If all transactions are successful or
unsuccessful, the algorithm simply returns a single node (i.e., root) tree, labeled
as ’+’ or ’–’ respectively (Line 2-7). If feature vector is empty, the algorithm
4Remind that we assume binary result of a transaction.
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Algorithm 1 Decision tree construction (code for trustor ax).
1: Trust ID3(Trax ,F )
2: if All past transactions are successful then
3: Return single node tree Root, with label = +.
4: end if
5: if All past transactions are unsuccessful then
6: Return single node tree Root, with label = –.
7: end if
8: if F = ∅ then
9: Return single node tree Root, with label = outcome of the transactions
that dominate all past transactions.
10: end if
11: Calculate information gain of all features and choose one feature (say, f),
which has the highest information gain as the Root node.
12: for each value v of f do
13: Add a new branch below Root.
14: Let Trax,f,v be the set of past transactions that have value v for feature
f .
15: if Trax,f,v = ∅ then
16: Below this branch add a leaf node with label = outcome of the trans-
actions that dominate all past transactions.
17: else
18: Below this branch add a sub-tree:
19: Trust ID3(Trax,f,v,F − {f}).
20: end if
21: end for
22: Return Root.
returns a single node tree, labeled as ’+’ if most of past transactions are success-
ful or ’–’ otherwise (Line 8-10). Then the algorithm calculates information gain
of each feature using Eq. 14. The feature (say, f) with the highest information
is selected as the root of the tree. Next, new branches are added to the root
node according to possible values of f . For each possible value v, we denote
the set of past transactions that have v for f by Trax,f,v. If Trax,f,v = ∅, the
algorithm adds a leaf node to the corresponding branch with label = ’+’ or ’–’ if
most of past transactions are successful or unsuccessful respectively. Otherwise,
the algorithm recursively executes itself with Trax,f,v and F −{f} as the input
parameters (Line 12-21). The algorithm terminates either when all the features
have been tested or the tree perfectly classifies the past transactions.
When encountering a potential transaction, ax tries to classify it as a risky
transaction or not by comparing the corresponding features from root of the
tree down to a certain leaf node. Note that for simplicity, we do not discuss
other issues in decision tree such as avoiding overfitting the data, etc.
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4 Algorithm recommendation confidence
Given a features vector, a set of past transactions and appropriate machine
learning algorithm, our trust framework is able to return a recommendation of
the potential transaction: be it risky or not. Confidence of such recommendation
relies on characteristics of input (e.g., discriminating power of the features,
volume of past transactions) and performance of the specific machine learning
algorithms in use5. So by performing the same algorithm, trustors with different
local knowledge and/or feature vectors may have quite different confidence on
the recommendations. We denote σ ∈ [0, 1] as the algorithm recommendation
confidence, where 0 represents the algorithm recommendation is not confident at
all (i.e., the recommendation is equally random) and 1 represents the algorithm
recommendation is completely confident. Algorithm input is denoted by <
F, T r >, where F = {f1, f2, ...} represents the feature vector and Tr = Trs∪Tru
represents the set of past transactions: Trs = {θs1, θ
s
2, ...} and Tru = {θ
u
1 , θ
u
2 , ...}
are the sets of successful transactions and unsuccessful transactions respectively.
We next present that given different inputs, how to measure confidence of the
algorithm recommendations still using linear discriminant analysis and decision
tree as the demonstration examples.
4.1 Measuring recommendation confidence for LDA based
algorithm
According to theory of linear discriminant analysis based algorithm (refer to Sec-
tion 3.1), each transaction is described by the input feature vector F (i.e., each
transaction is represented as a point in |F |-dimensional space.). So confidence
of the algorithm recommendation greatly depends on discriminating power of
the input features. If all the features are discriminating enough, LDA is able to
separate the successful and unsuccessful transactions clearly and minimize the
variance of each transaction group. Otherwise, the two transaction groups Trs
and Tru may overlap, thus making classification of the potential transaction
less confident. In other words, algorithm input determines the LDA projection
direction. After having the project direction, transaction group centroids are
transformed to lower dimension space. The potential transaction (after trans-
formed) is classified as risky or not by measuring the distances between it and
the two transaction group centroids. We denote the distances between the po-
tential transaction and successful/unsuccessful transaction group by Ds/Du.
Note that each set of distances correspond to one specific input: < Ds, Du >
= LDA(< F, T r >), where LDA() performs linear discriminant analysis to gen-
erate distances using the given input. The confidence of the algorithm recom-
mendation is then calculated as:
σLDA =
|Ds −Du|
Ds +Du
(15)
5Given the same input, different machine learning algorithms may generate different rec-
ommendations (perhaps due to their suitability in different application scenarios).
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It is clear from Eq. 15 that when Ds = Du, σLDA = 0, i.e., the potential
transaction is classified as risky or not with the same probability. When Ds
or Du is 0, σLDA = 1, i.e., the potential transaction is recommended to be
safe or not confidently. With σLDA, trustor is able to measure how confident
the algorithm outcome is and personally decides whether or not to trust the
algorithm recommendation.
4.2 Measuring recommendation confidence for DT based
algorithm
Since decision tree is constructed according to information gain of each fea-
ture (refer to Section 3.2), it is natural to measure algorithm recommendation
confidence using feature’s information gain. According to information theory,
information gain of a feature measures expected reduction in entropy by con-
sidering this feature. If a feature is discriminating enough, the corresponding
information gain is high (maximum value is log22 = 1), i.e., by appropriately
choosing values of this feature, the associated successful transactions and un-
successful transactions are separated clearly, thus the potential transaction can
be accurately classified by this feature. Otherwise, this feature may not help
classify the potential transaction accurately. So with different input data (i.e.,
feature vector and set of past transactions), different information gains for a
specific feature may be generated and hence different confidence on the classifi-
cation results may be obtained.
For each feature fi (with respect to a set of transactions Tri), we calculate
the corresponding entropy Entropy(Tri) and information gain IGain(Tri, fi)
using Eq. 13 and 14 respectively. We then calculate the extent of entropy
reduction by feature fi:
ri =
IGain(Tri, fi)
Entropy(Tri)
(16)
ri can be interpreted as the accuracy of classification of the potential trans-
action by feature fi (i.e., at the node corresponding fi in the decision tree.). We
notice from Eq. 16 that if fi is extremely discriminating, its information gain
is Entropy(Tri) (i.e., the second part of Eq. 14 is 0) and thus ri is 1, which
means the potential transaction classification by fi is completely accurate. If
feature fi is incapable of discriminating, its information gain is 0 and thus ri
is 0, which means classification of the potential transaction is inaccurate at all
(i.e., the classification is equally random.).
After having accuracy of classification of each feature, we calculate algorithm
recommendation confidence as:
σDT =
∏
i=1
ri (17)
So, if all the features are quite discriminating, the algorithm recommendation
confidence is approaching 1. Otherwise, any less discriminating feature shall
14
greatly impact the final confidence. This also follows the decision rule of the
decision tree based algorithm.
5 Local Knowledge Sharing Mechanism
Our trust framework works under the assumption that the trustor has sufficient
local knowledge such that machine learning algorithms can be performed. How-
ever, in some cases, agents may have no or sparse local knowledge (e.g., the
bootstrapping agents recently join the system or do not interact with others
frequently). To make our proposal adaptive to such a scenario, we propose to
construct a overlay network dedicated to exchange/share agents’ local knowledge
to help inexperienced agents estimate trustworthiness of a potential transaction.
5.1 Local Knowledge Sharing Overlay Network (LKSON)
To evaluate trustworthiness of a potential transaction, inexperienced agents have
to request other agents’ knowledge. A local knowledge sharing overlay network
(LKSON), which is a virtual network on top of current network infrastructure
(e.g., P2P network) is thus constructed. Fig. 2 depicts a LKSON, which is
represented by a directed graph. We give definition of LKSON:
Definition 1 (Local Knowledge Sharing Overlay Network) A local knowl-
edge sharing overlay network (LKSON) is a Weighted Directed Network (WDN),
denoted by LKSON = (V,E,T):
V = {a1, a2, a3, ...} is the set of agents in LKSON.
E = {ei,j|ai ∈ V
∧
aj ∈ V
∧
ai 6= aj} is the set of directed edges represent-
ing the trust relationship in terms of providing correct local knowledge between
knowledge requester ai and requestee aj.
T : E → [0, 1], trust score ti,j is assigned to edge ei,j and expresses from view-
point of ai, how trustworthy aj is in terms of providing local knowledge.
We set that the trust score falls into the range of [0,1], where 1 represents
completely trustworthy and 0 represents completely untrustworthy. Trust score
is determined according to requestee’s past performance (i.e., quality of provided
local knowledge). After each interaction, knowledge requester ai evaluates use-
fulness of the information provided by the requestee aj and accordingly updates
trust score of aj . Please note that since agent may have very personalized per-
spective on the system, even if requestee aj provides correct local knowledge,
it may not be useful to the requester. In this situation, aj ’s trust score will be
lowered although it is honest. We will discuss details of trust score update in
Section 5.2.
Notice that LKSON is constructed to ensure reliable local knowledge sharing
to help inexperienced agents estimate trustworthiness of a potential transaction,
but is not used to discover trustworthy transaction partner (i.e., LKSON is not
a trust overlay network like that in [33]) because it has been reported in related
literature [32], [28] that the agents who provide high quality service may not
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Figure 2: A local knowledge sharing overlay network.
report genuine feedbacks and vice versa due to various reasons. In the case that
the agents who provide useful information also act honestly in a transaction,
LKSON can be used to help promote successful transactions (i.e., selecting re-
liable agents who have high trust scores as the service providers). However, the
goal of this work is to design mechanisms to estimate trustworthiness of a po-
tential transaction, which is conducted by an unknown agent (i.e., no historical
information is available), so discussion on relying LKSON to estimate agent’s
trustworthiness like traditional trust mechanisms (e.g., feedbacks aggregation
[14], [4], [30], web of trust [1] [13], etc.) is out of the scope of this paper.
In order to collect useful information, inexperienced agents only request the
agents who are trustworthy (i.e., trust score is high) in terms of providing useful
local knowledge. So in our approach, each agent a′ in the system maintains a
Trusted Knowledge Provider list PRa′ which stores the agents that this agent
has trust relationship in terms of providing useful local knowledge. Initially,
when requestees’ past performance is not available, an inexperienced agent re-
quests information by exploring the social network. For instance, it may request
its “familiar” agents (e.g., friends or colleagues in the real world, etc.); or the
agent may request “special” agent/entity (if any) in the network (e.g., super
peer in hybrid peer-to-peer network, or advisor in Epinions [7], or authorized
third parties, e.g., “official” source in public key infrastructure, etc.). In the case
that no “familiar” or “special” agents are there (i.e., no useful information at
all), the inexperienced agent will choose knowledge provider randomly to create
its Trusted Knowledge Provider list.
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We next present detail of LKSON design using LDA as the demonstration
example. Some issues like what kind of information is shared, how to combine
knowledge of multiple sources and how to update relationships among agents in
LKSON, etc. will be discussed.
5.1.1 What is Shared?
To help an inexperienced agent detect a potentially risky transaction, two types
of local knowledge, which are represented as a tuple <v, (cs, cu)> are shared
among the agents6:
(i) the projection direction v that maximizes the inter class variance and
minimizes the intra class variance (see Sec. 3.1).
(ii) centroid of the successful group cs and unsuccessful group cu.
The main reasons that these two types of knowledge are shared: (1) the knowl-
edge providers have no motivation to send fake information because they are
unaware of requester’s potential transaction partner thus are unable to de-
fame/promote the transaction partner or mislead the requester maliciously7.
That is, this is safer than directly requesting others’ trusts in the target agent,
which is very easy to be attacked). (2) the projection direction v is shared,
which means requester does not need to compute it so a lot of computation is
saved. The process of deriving projection direction is the most computation-
intensive part of LDA. (3) the shared knowledge is just projection direction and
centroid of successful and unsuccessful groups so it is not easy to dig out agent’s
privacy through shared information. This is important to knowledge providers
and their past transaction partners. (4) The shared knowledge is of small size
so the communication overheads incurred are marginal compared to the cost of
sending the whole local knowledge base.
5.1.2 Combining Third Party Knowledge
When an agent ai (with no local knowledge) encounters a potential transac-
tion p = (f1f2f3...fd), where f represents feature. ai requests local knowl-
edge of other agents that are recorded in ai’s Trusted Knowledge Provider
list PROV IDER(ai) to predict trustworthiness of p. We denote the set of
knowledge providers who response and provide the requested information by
KPi = {ai1, a
i
2, a
i
3, ..., a
i
ni
}. So the size of KPi is ni. The corresponding trust
scores of these knowledge providers are denoted by TS = {ti1, t
i
2, t
i
3, ..., t
i
ni
},
where tij represents ai’s trust in the jth knowledge provider. The local knowl-
edge shared by the jth knowledge provider is represented by <vj, (cs,j , cu,j)>.
6We assume that all the agents have the same features such that the projection direction
v can be shared and combined meaningfully.
7This reason is sometimes not true (e.g., the knowledge provider may learn requester’s
transaction partner from other ways, or the provider simply sends incorrect information for
fun, etc.). We address this issue by updating Trusted Knowledge Provider list, which will be
described in Sec. 5.2.
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The collected knowledge is combined to produce a classifier that helps es-
timate whether p is likely to get classified to the successful group or not. The
resultant projection direction is derived as the weighted sum of all collected
projection direction:
vi =
ni∑
j
wjvj (18)
Similarly, the resultant centroid of successful group and unsuccessful group
are calculated as:
cs,i =
ni∑
j
wjcs,j (19)
cu,i =
ni∑
j
wjcu,j (20)
The weight wj for the jth knowledge provider is determined by its trust
score:
wj =
tij∑ni
j t
i
j
(21)
After combining other knowledge providers’ projection direction (vi), ai
transforms the combined centroid (cs,i, cu,i) using vi. Similarly, the poten-
tial transaction p is also transformed and classified using Euclidean distance of
transformed data from each transformed centroid. The distances are computed
using Eq. 11 and 12.
5.2 LKSON Update
Since behaviors of the agents may change overtime (e.g., honest knowledge
provider may provide fake information or they may change their perspective
on the system thus making the shared knowledge not useful to the requester
any more, etc.), it is essential to update trust scores of the knowledge providers
such that the inaccurate/useless knowledge has less impact on the final decision.
It is effective if we adapt trust scores of the knowledge providers accordingly
every time a transaction is completed. However, such strategy is inefficient be-
cause it incurs unnecessary computation overheads. That is, only trust scores
of the knowledge providers whose local knowledge produces contrary prediction
on the outcome of the transaction need to be updated. So we adapt a strat-
egy by trading off computation overhead and performance, that is, after one
transaction, if its outcome is unsuccessful, the requester ai evaluates usefulness
of local knowledge of each knowledge provider. For knowledge provider aij , ai
simply uses vj as the projection direction to calculate distances of transformed
potential transaction from the transformed centroid (see Eq. 11 and 12). If
the transaction is predicted as successful, it means the corresponding knowl-
edge is incorrect or useless to ai so trust score of the knowledge provider a
i
j
must be lowered such that it has less impact on future decision. Otherwise,
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the trust score should be raised. The trust score update follows a Bayesian ap-
proach [14], which takes binary ratings as input and is based on computing trust
scores by statistically updating beta probability density function (PDF). The
posteriori trust score is computed by combining a priori trust score with new
evidence. For knowledge provider aij , we denote numbers of its successful and
unsuccessful predictions by sij and u
i
j respectively (i.e., the original trust score
tij is
sij+1
si
j
+ui
j
+2
). So aij ’s trust score is updated after one transaction using Eq. 22
(the new prediction is correct) and Eq. 23 (the new prediction is incorrect).
tij =
sij + 2
sij + u
i
j + 3
(22)
tij =
sij + 1
sij + u
i
j + 3
(23)
On the other hand, if the transaction is successful, the requester will evaluate
usefulness of a small fraction (e.g., 20%) of the third party knowledge. This can
help (1) avoid incurring too much unnecessary computation overheads because
if the transaction is successful, it means combination of current third party
knowledge is accurate enough to make a good prediction so no update is needed
urgently and (2) proactively adjust weights of the third party knowledge thus
making the combined knowledge more accurate (for the next prediction) while
keeping the computation overheads low.
6 Evaluation
6.1 Simulation settings
We use real dataset collected from an Internet auction site Allegro [3] as well
as synthetic data to conduct experiments. The Allegro dataset contains 10,000
sellers, 10,000 buyers, more than 200,000 transactions and over 1.7 million com-
ments. In the experiments, a transaction is considered successful if its feedback
is positive, otherwise, it is considered unsuccessful. We extract three features
from Allegro data, i.e., F1: category of the item; F2: price of the item, F3:
number of items already sold by the seller when the transaction occurs and F4:
fraction of non-positive feedbacks of the seller. We evaluate performance of our
proposal, i.e., LDA based approach and DT based approach by studying their
capabilities of detecting Internet auction fraud. When a buyer encounters a po-
tential transaction, which is conducted by an unknown seller (i.e., no historical
information of this seller is available), this buyer will gather past transactions
regarding the item category (i.e., F1) and then perform LDA or DT to estimate
trustworthiness of this transaction using features F2, F3 and F4.
Allegro has a very friendly environment: only around 0.9% of the trans-
actions are labeled negative explicitly. To test our proposal in a more hos-
tile environment, and also to compare proposed algorithms with other existing
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trust mechanisms, we generate synthetic dataset consisting of 10,000 nodes.
Each node is either good, which provides service satisfactorily or gives genuine
feedbacks when requested, or malicious, which cheats others in transactions or
provides false feedbacks when requested. To make the simulation environment
more realistic, there are no completely good or bad nodes. We set good nodes
and malicious nodes behave maliciously with probabilities of 15% and 85% re-
spectively. We denote the fraction of malicious nodes in the system by Pm. In
the simulation, any node (trustor) may request service from other nodes (service
provider or the target node). Once the transaction with service provider (target
node) is done, trustor rates the transactions to indicate whether they are suc-
cessful or not. The trustor stores information of these transactions (see Table
1) such as their outcomes and the associated features. In synthetic dataset,
to construct LKSON, each node also maintains a Trusted Knowledge Provider
list, which records other nodes that will be requested if this node does not have
sufficient local knowledge.
We also need to generate synthetic features. Note that each transaction is
described by four features8. Let Xs and Xu be the random variables which rep-
resent values of features of successful and unsuccessful transactions respectively.
We assume that Xs and Xu follow normal distribution, i.e., Xs ∼ N (µ, σ) and
Xu ∼ N (µ + θ, σ). In our experiments µ = 1, σ = 0.1 and θ ∈ [0, 1] is the
separability factor that we use to tune the overlap between values of features
of successful transactions and that of unsuccessful ones. When θ = 0, values of
features for successful and unsuccessful transactions overlap completely, while
when θ is large enough, it means values of features for successful and unsuccess-
ful transactions are separated clearly. In other words, θ allows us to modify the
learnability of the transaction classes. Note that since only our approaches are
based on features, θ only impacts performance of our approaches.
We compare our proposal with three existing models: (1) Random Selection:
The simplest approach is to engage or reject a potential transaction randomly.
In the simulation, we set the probability that trustor accepts a potential trans-
action to 50%. This model is used as the experiments benchmark. (2) Feedback
Aggregation: In this model [14, 32, 30], if trustor does not know target node,
it asks other nodes across the network and aggregate feedbacks to derive tar-
get node’s trust. False feedback filtering mechanism (from TRAVOS [30]) is
applied to improve performance (3) StereoTrust [17]: Trustor forms groups of
agents with which it has past experience according to the features and derives
trust rating of the target agent by combining group trusts to which the tar-
get agent belongs. Please refer to related work section for a brief summary of
StereoTrust.
Note that we only compare our proposal with the existing models when
synthetic data is used because we lack the information of how users in Allegro
apply these existing models.
The metrics we use to evaluate performance of trust mechanisms include:
8We also conducted experiments using other numbers of features and obtained the similar
qualitative trends.
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• false positive rate
The transaction is unsuccessful but the algorithm predicted that it would
be successful.
• false negative rate
The transaction is successful but the algorithm predicted that it would be
risky.
• overall falseness
Sum of false positive rate and false negative rate.
Each experiment is repeated 10 times, and error bars are added indicate
deviation of each running.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Real dateset
We rank the 10,000 buyers according to number of their past transactions, i.e.,
the first buyer has the most past transactions and the last one has the least
transactions. We select subset Ub of these buyers starting from the first one.
Each buyer evaluates 100 randomly selected transactions (50% are successful
and 50% are unsuccessful). We vary the size of Ub to investigate effect of local
knowledge volume.
Fig. 3(a) demonstrates performance of our approach (LDA and DT based),
i.e., how average rates of false positive and false negative evolve when Ub varies
from 5 to 500. As expected, all falseness rates increase when Ub grows. This
shows the impact of local knowledge on our proposed algorithms: when Ub is
small, it contains only experienced agents, that all have enough past transactions
to allow our approach to issue accurate predictions. As Ub grows, it contains
more and more inexperienced agents, for which the predictions are less accu-
rate. We also notice that DT based algorithm is less accurate than LDA based
algorithm. This is because basic decision tree is more suitable for qualitative
features while features identified in auction data are quantitative (i.e., it is not
easy to obtain the appropriate thresholds to efficiently split the training data.).
Fig. 3(b) shows the distribution of numbers of individual buyers’ past trans-
actions (only first 3000 are shown). Note the logarithmic scale for y-axis: the
number of past transactions is quickly decreasing. For instance, less than 100
agents have more than 20 past transactions. Estimating the minimal number
of transactions that allow our approach to be precise is challenging, since not
all transactions have the same importance (e.g., two very different transactions
will be much more useful for our approach than two identical transactions).
However, in this set of experiments, we estimate empirically that when num-
bers of transactions is over 6, the potential transaction can be relatively reliably
predicted (i.e., the overall falseness rate is smaller than 0.1 for LDA based al-
gorithm and 0.19 for DT based algorithm). Simulation results thus show that
our approach is capable of quickly “learning” what a successful or unsuccessful
transaction is.
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Figure 3: Experiments using Allegro dataset.
In online auction sites, most of the buyers are inexperienced (local knowl-
edge is insufficient). So to predict trustworthiness of the potential transaction,
the inexperienced buyer will collect other buyers’ local knowledge to perform
our approach by constructing LKSON. LKSON is initialized by connecting this
buyer and other buyers according to categories that they are interested in (i.e.,
the item this buyer is going to buy is in the category from which the connected
buyers used to buy items). Third party knowledge indeed helps inexperienced
buyer predict trustworthiness of the potential transaction, however, it also in-
troduced inaccurate information, which may influence accuracy of prediction
because third party knowledge only reflects knowledge provider’s personalized
perspective on the system. For instance, one buyer can tolerate one day delay of
item delivery (successful transaction) while another buyer can not (unsuccessful
transaction). We thus need to estimate how many other buyers are requested
to gather sufficient knowledge while trying to keep influence of inaccurate infor-
mation as low as possible.
Fig. 4 demonstrates how performance of our approach (LDA based) varies
with the varying number of requested buyers (from 10 to 110 with 10 as incre-
ment). We observe that the general trends of the false positive rate and false
negative rate are: they decline with the increasing number of requested buyers
and stop at a certain point, then they start ascending. This is because when
the number of requested buyers is low, there are not sufficient past transac-
tions available thus affecting the accuracy of prediction (i.e., not statistically
significant). On the other hand, when the number of requested buyers is high,
lots of transactions are collected, which means more inaccurate information is
incorporated, hence the accuracy of prediction is also influenced. So the lowest
point is the optimal result that our approach is able to achieve and the corre-
sponding number of requested buyers is the design parameter we are looking
for. From the figure we can see the most suitable number of requested buyers in
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this scenario is 60 and the corresponding false positive rate and false negative
rate are 0.08 and 0.042 respectively.
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Figure 4: Performance of our approach (LDA) with LKSON (real dataset).
6.2.2 Synthetic dataset
We compare performance of our approach with other existing trust models (Fig.
5, 6, 7 and 8). Notice that when local knowledge is sufficient (i.e., at least three
successful transactions and three unsuccessful transactions), trustor relies on
its local knowledge to perform our approach. Otherwise, trustor will integrate
third party information via LKSON.
We observe that when Pm is low, feedback aggregation model performs quite
well. This is because when most of nodes in the system are honest, the aggre-
gated feedbacks can accurately predict behavior of the service provider thus
keeping rates of false positive, false negative as well as overall falseness low.
However, with the increase of Pm, various falseness increases sharply. So accu-
racy of feedback aggregation model heavily depends on percentage of malicious
nodes and thus is not suitable for a hostile environment.
One interesting thing about feedback aggregation model is that its false
negative rate decreases when Pm is larger than 0.5 (Fig. 5(b), 6(b), 7(b) and
8(b)). The possible reason is that when Pm is high, the amount of false feedbacks
increases thus increasing the falseness probability. On the other hand, the total
amount of successful transactions decreases generally, so the false negative rate
decreases.
Random selection model, as we expected, provides a stable rate of overall
falseness of 0.5 because we let trustor accept or reject transactions equiprobably.
This model is the benchmark of the experiments, demonstrating falseness rate
evolution in the scenario where no trust management is applied.
StereoTrust model outperforms feedback aggregation in general especially
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Figure 5: Comparison of our approach with other approaches (θ = 0.2).
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Figure 6: Comparison of our approach with other approaches (θ = 0.4).
when Pm is high. This is because even though StereoTrust also relies on some
feedbacks to predict behavior of the target node, it only requests nodes that
are honest (from its own perspective) thus the probability of receiving false
feedbacks is relatively low.
We observe that DT based approach is less accurate than LDA based ap-
proach in all scenarios. This result conforms to the result when real data is
used (Fig. 3(a)) and further proves that LDA based algorithm is more suitable
to the scenarios where features are quantitative. So to sum up, LDA based
approach, which has the lowest rate of various falseness outperforms all other
models (except for the scenarios that θ is quite small, i.e., when θ ≤ 0.4). When
θ is quite small, both LDA based approach and DT based approach suffer from
low accuracy of classification. Finding features that can distinguish successful
transactions from unsuccessful ones is thus the key of our approach. We also
notice that performance of our approaches are quite stable (not affected by Pm
very much). This is because our approach mainly relies on local knowledge,
which is the most reliable information source. Note that since our approach
relies on different kinds of information, it may not be rather fair to compare
with other models that only use one kind of information (i.e., target agent’s his-
torical information). Moreover, in some application scenarios, the information
used by our approach (e.g., features) may not be always available. Nevertheless,
whenever such information is there, our approach indeed produces reasonable
results thus demonstrating its efficiency.
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Figure 7: Comparison of our approach with other approaches (θ = 0.6).
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Figure 8: Comparison of our approach with other approaches (θ = 0.8).
7 Related Work
Most existing reputation based trust management mechanisms derive an agent’s
trustworthiness based on that specific agent’s past behavior (e.g., [1, 21, 16, 4,
34, 31, 29]). If the assessing agent has sufficient direct experience with a provider
agent, this provider’s future behavior can be reliably predicted [21]. However,
in large-scale distributed settings, direct experience is often unavailable. In this
case, the assessing agent may resort to “indirect experience” – opinions about
the assessed agent obtained from other agents [1, 14, 16, 32, 31]. Simple aggre-
gation (like a seller’s ranking on eBay) relies on access to global information like
history of the assessed agent’s behavior. Alternatively, transitive trust models
[1, 13] forms chains of trust relationships among agents. However, transitive
trust is not always realistic in the real deployment and it has several drawbacks:
(i) this method does not handle wrong recommendations properly, which affect
the accuracy of derived trust seriously [6]. (ii) This method does not provide a
mechanism for updating trust efficiently in a dynamic system. (iii) Establishing
a trust path, even if such a path exists, is nontrivial.
EigenTrust [16] is a reputation system developed for P2P networks. Eigen-
Trust uses transitivity of trust and aggregates trust from peers by performing
a distributed calculation to determine the eigenvector of a “trust matrix” over
peers. It relies on some pre-trusted peers, which are supposed to be trusted
by all peers. EigenTrust (and some other reputation systems like [32, 33]) is
designed based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) [27, 26, 2] thus imposing sys-
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tem design complexity and drawbacks, deployment and message overheads [8].
[25] proposed a trust system that is built on top of a peer group infrastructure
using an EigenTrust-like calculation approach. The groups are formed based on
particular interest criterions and members must follow the set of rules of the
group they belong to. The authors assumed that a group leader creates the
group and controls the membership. To calculate trust, the authors introduced
Eigen Group Trust, which is an aggregative version of EigenTrust. In Eigen
Group trust, all the transactions rely on the group leaders, who are assumed to
be trusted and resourceful.
GossipTrust [34] is another reputation management system designed for P2P
networks. More specifically, it is designed for unstructured P2P networks. The
basic idea of GossipTrust is to aggregate global reputation scores using a gossip
based algorithm. The gossiping process stops when a gossiping error threshold
is reached. Such approach has the advantage of a fast dissemination of global
scores with time complexity of O(log2(n)), where n is the number of peers in
the network.
The Beta Reputation System (BRS) [14] is a probabilistic trust model, which
is based on the beta distribution. In BRS, after each interaction, service re-
quester gives rating to performance of the service provider, where rating is a
binary value: positive or negative. The ratings are then used to estimate shape
parameters that determine the reputation of the assessed agent. However, BRS
does not show how it is able to cope with false information, which may influence
accuracy of prediction seriously.
TRAVOS [30] is a trust and reputation model for agent-based virtual or-
ganizations. This work also makes use of beta distribution to compute trust
but it pays more attention to the issue of unfair feedbacks. When a buyer
evaluates a potential interaction partner (i.e., seller), it first uses its own local
knowledge to derive trustworthiness of the seller. It then estimates accuracy
of the direct trust, that is the probability that the real likelihood of cheating
falls in the certain range from the buyer’s estimation. If the direct trust is
accurate enough, the buyer simply relies on this direct experience based trust.
Otherwise, it requests feedbacks from other buyers who have interacted with
the potential seller. To ensure that only accurate feedbacks are considered,
TRAVOS addresses inaccurate reputation feedbacks by performing two tasks:
(1) Estimating the probability that a feedback provider’s opinion of the seller is
accurate. This is done by comparing current feedback with the previous feed-
backs provided by the same buyer. The accuracy of the current feedback is
the expected value of the beta PDF representing the numbers of successful and
unsuccessful interactions between the buyer and the seller when the buyer is
guided by the previous feedbacks. (2) Adjusting reputation feedback according
to its accuracy to reduce the effect of inaccurate feedback.
Different from works mentioned above, StereoTrust [17] uses another kind of
information, i.e., stereotypes to estimate the initial trust of an unknown agent.
A stereotype is determined by a feature vector, which can be taken from the
profile of the agent. To build stereotypes, the agents that trustor has interacted
with are classified into groups according to the identified features. Stereotypes
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on each group are calculated by aggregating trustor’s past experience with mem-
bers of that group. Then, when facing the target agent, the trustor estimates
its trust using stereotypes on groups to which the target agent belongs. Ad-
ditionally, when some information about stranger’s past behavior is available,
enhanced StereoTrust model (called d-StereoTrust) uses it to refine the stereo-
type matching. StereoTrust simply aggregates stereotypes by assigning intuitive
weights to derive trust of the target agent, thus is not able to tell which stereo-
types are more important than other ones. Differently, by applying sophisticated
machine learning algorithms, our approach is capable of distinguishing which
feature is more discriminating thus making the prediction more accurate.
Similar to StereoTrust, [5] proposed to bootstrap trust of an unknown agent
through stereotypes, which are estimated based on M5 model tree learning al-
gorithm [23]. This work also discussed how to combine initial trust (i.e., based
on stereotypes) and reputation based trust using subjective logic [12]. Differ-
ently, our approach focuses on transaction instead of individual agent. This
helps address the inconsistency of the agent behavior since its target is not
individual agents but overall viewpoint on a group of agents that share the sim-
ilar properties. Moveover, our approach emphasizes the useful feature selection
by performing machine learning algorithms and demonstrates its efficacy in a
realistic setting using a real auction dataset.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a generic trust framework, which is designed for large-
scale, open systems. Our approach is generically based on machine learning
algorithms, which provide classification of a potential transaction by learning
a set of past transactions. In this work we instantiate the framework using
two common machine learning algorithms, i.e., linear discriminant analysis and
decision tree. Unlike many existing trust mechanisms, which rely on specific
agent’s historical information to predict its future behavior, our approach only
uses trustor’s local knowledge. This makes our approach quite suitable for a
large-scale distributed environment where historical information of the agent in
question is scarce or even not available, and third party information about the
agent may not be reliable or expensive to obtain.
In case that trustor does not have sufficient local knowledge, we propose
to construct a local knowledge sharing overlay network (LKSON) to exchange
agents’ local knowledge (i.e., intermediate results of classification algorithms)
to predict trustworthiness of a potential transaction. Compared to traditional
feedback aggregation based trust and reputation systems, such mechanism helps
(1) reduce the possibility of sharing fake information; (2) avoid privacy leakage,
(3) save a lot of computation and (4) avoid high communication overhead.
Not surprisingly, simulation results show that performance of our approach
is positively correlated with the discrimination power of features on successful
interactions and unsuccessful interactions. However, compared to other trust
models, our approach is quite efficient, especially when third party information
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is not reliable. Moreover, performance of our approach is quite stable because it
only relies on trustor’s local knowledge. The real Allegro dataset based simula-
tion shows that the proposed approach can be applied to real application (e.g.,
detecting Internet auction frauds).
In the future works, we are going to investigate more sophistical statistical
tools (e.g., Multiple Discriminant Analysis, etc.) to further improve accuracy
of our approach. Another direction is to apply the proposal to some concrete
applications such as recommending interesting contents in web 2.0 sites (e.g.,
YouTube9, Digg10, etc.).
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